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I. Introduction 
 
Michele Wucker coined the phrase “gray rhino” to describe a “highly 
probable, high impact threat” that leaders “ought to see coming but 
nevertheless fail to recognize and react to in time.”1 The impact of the 
rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”), robotics, and automation on the 
tax system falls squarely within the definition of a gray rhino. 
Technological change promises major dislocations in the economy, 
including potentially massive displacement of human workers. At the 
same time, government revenues dependent on the taxation of human 
employment will diminish at the very time displaced workers will 
increasingly demand social services. It is undeniable that drastic 
changes will have to be made, but until recently there has been little 
appetite among policymakers for addressing the situation. 
 
One potential solution to this dilemma has emerged in the public 
discourse over the past few years: the “robot tax.”2 This proposal is 
driven by the idea that if robots (and AI and automation) are displacing 
human workers, and thereby reducing tax revenues from labor-based 
taxes, then the robots themselves should be taxed. In theory, this kills 
two birds with one stone: the robot taxes make up the shortfall caused 
by reductions in income and payroll taxes, and the revenues raised are 
used to support and retrain the displaced workers. To supporters of a 
robot tax, “a taxation of robots, or the use of robots, represents a 
powerful and interesting alternative solution to a potential crucial 
issue: the decline, or at least the complete change, of labor market and 
the distributional implications on persons of the growing use of 
automation.”3  
 
 
 
 
1 MICHELE WUCKER, THE GRAY RHINO 7 (2016). 
2 While the term “robot tax” has gained the widest currency, many of the proposals embrace 
AI, robotics, and other types of automation. The common thread between these proposals 
being the advancement of technology that threatens to displace human workers. See generally 
XAVIER OBERSON, TAXING ROBOTS: HELPING THE ECONOMY TO ADAPT TO THE USE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1-4 (2019) (describing proposals to tax AI and robotics as a “robot 
tax”). Accordingly, while I will refer to “robot tax” herein, my analysis applies with equal 
force to taxes directed specifically at AI, robotics, and automation. 
3 Id. at 3-4. 
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Robot tax proposals have attracted academic interest among 
economists,4 legal scholars in the technology and employment fields5 
and, increasingly, tax law scholars.6 Much of the focus has been on 
 
 
 
 
4 See, e.g., Pengqing Zhang, Automation, Wage Inequality and Implications of a Robot Tax, 59 
INT’L REV. OF ECON. & FIN. 500 (2019); Germana Bottone, A Tax on Robots? Some food for 
thought, (Ministro dell’Economica e delle Finanze DF Working Paper No. 3 (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.finanze.it/export/sites/finanze/it/.content/Documenti/Varie/dfwp3_2018.pdf; 
Arnaud Costinot & Ivan Werning, Robots, Trade, and Luddism: A Sufficient Statistic 
Approach to Optimal Technology Regulation, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. ResearchWorking Paper 
No. 25103, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25103.pdf; Joao Guerriero, Sergio Rebelo, 
& Pedro Teles, Should Robots Be Taxed? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 23806, 2019), https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/rebelo/htm/robots.pdf; 
Vincent Ooi & Glendon Goh, Taxation of Automation and Artificial Intelligence as a Tool of 
Labour Policy (SMU Ctr. for AI & Data Governance, Research Paper No. 2019/01, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3322306; Uwe Thuemmel, Optimal 
Taxation of Robots (CESifo, Working Paper No. 7317,2018), http://uwethuemmel.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/Thuemmel2018_OptimalTaxationOfRobots_August.pdf; see also 
Anton Korinek & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Artificial Intelligence and its Implications for Income 
Distribution and Unemployment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24174, 
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24174.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the 
Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145 (2018); Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence 
Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 426-27 (2017); Ana Čulo, 
Oporezivanje Robota: Utjecaj Automatizacije Na Radna Mjesta I Održivost Postojećeg 
Fiskalnog Sustava, 7 ZAGREB L. REV. 71 (2018); Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After 
Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 315-18 (2018); A. Michael 
Froomkin et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced 
Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 92-93 (2019).  
6 See, e.g., OBERSON, supra note 2; Sami Ahmed, Cryptocurrency & Robots: How to Tax and 
Pay Tax on Them, 69 S. C. L. REV. 697 (2018); Christina Dimitropoulou, Robot Taxes: Where 
Do We stand?, in CFE TAX ADVISERS EUROPE – 60TH ANNIVERSARY LIBER AMICORUM 55 
(2019); Stefano Dorigo, Robots and Taxes: Turning an Apparent Threat Into an Opportunity, 
92 TAX NOTES INT’L 1079 (2018); Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 27 (2019); 
Xavier Oberson, Taxing Robots? From the Emergence of an Electronic Ability to Pay to a Tax 
on Robots or the Use of Robots, 1 WORLD TAX J. 247 (2017); Joachim Englisch, Digitalisation 
and the Future of National Tax Systems: Taxing Robots? (Sept. 5, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244670; Vasiliki Koukoulioti, What Are You Taxing 
About? Balancing Out the Tax System to Avoid the Consequences of Automation in the 
Welfare System, CTR. FOR LEGAL & CT. TECH. (April 24, 2019), 
https://legaltechcenter.openum.ca/files/sites/159/2019/04/Koukoulioti-What-Are-You-tAxIng-
About-Balancing-Out-the-Tax-System-to-Avoid-Consequences-of-Automation-in-the-
Welfare-System.docx_.pdf; Shu-Yi Oei, So about that Robot Tax…, SURLY SUBGROUP (Aug. 
16, 2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/08/16/so-about-that-robot-tax/; Kerry Ryan, Taxing 
R2-D2? ABA Tax Section Panel on Automation and AI, SURLY SUBGROUP (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://surlysubgroup.com/2018/02/16/taxing-r2-d2/. This is by no means an exhaustive list. 
For a U.S. tax practitioner’s perspective, see Robert J. Kovacev, The Challenges of 
Administering a Robot Tax, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/967115/the-challenges-of-administering-a-robot-tax.  
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economic and policy arguments for and against robot taxes. There has 
been far less analysis of the practical difficulties of drafting and 
administering such a tax. This is hardly surprising, given that the field 
is so new, and few proposals have actually been boiled down to 
statutory language. From the perspective of a tax lawyer, however, the 
statutory language is vitally important to the administrability and 
feasibility of a robot tax proposal. Therefore, this article examines the 
practical aspects of a robot tax, including ways in which such a tax 
could be drafted and implemented. 
 
Part II of this article sets forth the current tax regime’s inherent 
preference for capital over labor. Part III discusses the effect of AI, 
robotics and automation both on employment and on tax revenues. 
Part IV outlines the emergence of robot tax proposals as a potential 
remedy for those effects. Part V addresses the challenges arising from 
these proposals. Part VI analyzes specific legislative robot tax 
proposals from the United States and internationally. Part VII 
considers whether a robot tax could be designed that would address the 
challenges discussed in Part V. Part VIII concludes. 
 
II. The Current Tax Regime Favors Capital Over Labor 
 
Taxes on labor income form the backbone of the tax regimes of the 
United States and other developed nations. Across the member states 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”),7 approximately 50% of all tax revenues in 2015 came from 
either individual income taxes or social insurance taxes.8 In the United 
States, this reliance on tax revenue from human effort is even more 
pronounced. In 2015, 64.2% of all tax revenue came either from 
individual income taxes or payroll taxes.9 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Where: Global Reach, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/ 
[https://perma.cc/R5ZR-GYEP] (the OECD is an international intergovernmental organization 
with 36 nations as members, including the United States). 
8 Amir El-Sibaie, Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2018, TAX FOUNDATION 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180322141501/Tax-Foundation-FF581.pdf.  
9 Id. at 3. 
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In the United States in particular, the tax code favors capital over labor 
income.10 Employers and employees must pay payroll taxes that are, in 
effect, excise taxes for the privilege of employing human workers.11 
No such taxes apply to capital investments in AI, robotics, or 
automation. Instead, businesses receive substantial tax benefits from 
developing, purchasing, and deploying AI, robotics, and automation 
equipment.12  
 
This effect was amplified by the recent tax reform legislation. On 
December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law sweeping tax 
legislation commonly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(“TCJA”).13 Supporters of the TCJA emphasized the legislation’s 
reduction of income tax rates, particularly on corporations, which it 
was asserted would create jobs. One of the most significant features of 
the TCJA was the so-called 100% expensing provision, which allowed 
businesses to deduct the entire expense of certain capital investments 
in the year of acquisition, rather than having to take depreciation 
deductions over time.14 The TCJA contained no corresponding tax 
benefit for hiring more employees.  
 
Given the structure of the U.S. tax code, many commentators have 
come to the conclusion that “many businesses are investing in 
automation simply because the tax code is urging them to do so.”15 
 
 
 
 
10 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 150-51; Mazur, supra note 6, at 292-93. 
11 I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111; see Estlund, supra note 5, at 309 n.210 (“Payroll taxes in general are 
the most regressive large category of taxes (in Europe as well as in the United States)”). See 
generally I.R.C. §§ 3101-3512 (“Employment Taxes”). 
12 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 41, 162, 167, 174, 179, 197. Sometimes seemingly neutral tax incentives 
can have the effect of encouraging deployment of robots. See, e.g., Carrie Healy, To Keep 
Operating, New England Dairy Farm Looks To 'Milking Robots,' Tax Credits, NEW ENGLAND 
PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nepr.net/post/keep-operating-new-england-dairy-
farm-looks-milking-robots-tax-credits (explaining dairy tax credits used to subsidize 
installation of milking robots). 
13 Pub. L. No. 115-97, Title I, § 13305(a), 131 Stat. 2126 (2017).  
14 Pub. L. No. 115-97 Title I, § 13201 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. § 168(k)); see Mazur, supra 
note 6, at 295; see also Andrew Tangel & Patrick McGroarty, Tax Incentive Puts More Robots 
on Factory Floors, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-
incentive-puts-more-robots-on-factory-floors-1516962600 [https://perma.cc/7Q8C-C56X]. 
15 Eduardo Porter, Don’t Fight the Robots, Tax Them, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/sunday-review/tax-artificial-intelligence.html 
[https://perma.cc/5V7W-LH8E]; see also Chris Arnold, Tax Bill Favors Adding Robots Over 
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Certainly, the current tax structure does little to preserve employment 
in the face of growing pressure from AI, robotics and automation. 
 
III. Effect of AI and Robotics 
 
The effect of technological improvements on the economy and society 
has been widely debated for centuries.16 The rise of AI, robotics, and 
automation may bring about change of a different order than past 
innovations, however.17 The effect of the rise of AI and robotics has 
been described as a “fourth industrial revolution,” reflecting the 
significant impact on the economy and society that is widely 
anticipated.18 While “it was previously possible to automate a large 
number of work processes, it has now become practicable.”19 And 
automation of tasks may lead to the elimination of the jobs and 
livelihoods of those humans currently employed in those tasks.20 While 
estimates vary, some studies place the estimate of lost jobs as high as 
57% among OECD countries, and even higher in India and China.21  
 
Workers, Critics Say, NPR (Dec. 8, 2017, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/08/ 
569118310/tax-bill-favors-adding-robots-over-workers-critics-say [https://perma.cc/W6R8-
WF7V]. 
16 See, e.g., Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 156-58; see also Bruno Colmant, Faut-
il Taxer les Robots? [Should Robots be Taxed?], L’ECHO (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://bruxselsfuture.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/taxer-les-robots-colmant.pdf (citing the 
work of nineteenth-century Swiss economist Jean de Sismondi, who proposed a tax on the 
owners of machines). 
17 MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 
29-61 (2016); JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT 
AND PRODUCTIVITY, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ 
McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Digital%20Disruption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%2
0a%20future%20that%20works/MGI-A-future-that-works_Full-report.ashx; see also 
MICROSOFT, THE FUTURE COMPUTED: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY 87-
136 (2018). 
18 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond, WORLD 
ECON. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-
revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ [https://perma.cc/D4NZ-DHUU]. 
19 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 153. 
20 Id. at 159. But see Jeff Spross, How Robots Became a Scapegoat for the Destruction of the 
Working Class, THE WEEK (Apr. 29, 2019), https://theweek.com/articles/837759/how-robots-
became-scapegoat-destruction-working-class [https://perma.cc/5MUA-FQX8] (arguing that 
“the automation we're seeing now is little different from the technological advances we've 
seen in every other era”). 
21 CARL B. FREY ET AL., CITI GPS, TECHNOLOGY AT WORK V2.0: THE FUTURE IS NOT WHAT IT 
USED TO BE 7 (Jan. 2016), https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/reports/ 
Citi_GPS_Technology_Work_2.pdf; Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future 
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The rise of AI, robotics, and automation will have a concomitant effect 
on government tax revenues. As noted in Part I above, the tax base in 
the OECD, particularly in the United States, is heavily dependent on 
labor (through individual income taxes or payroll taxes). In a vicious 
circle, at the same time that automation increases the need for 
government spending to support displaced workers, it will also 
decrease tax receipts.22 It is not at all clear that other forms of taxation, 
such as corporate taxes, would be sufficient to pick up the slack.23 
 
IV. The Rise of Robot Tax Proposals 
 
The first prominent robot tax proposal came from the European Union. 
In 2017, Mady Delvaux, Member of the European Parliament from 
Luxembourg, prepared a report with recommendations to the European 
Parliament for the regulation of robotics.24 The recommendation 
included an explicit statement in favor of considering a robot tax.25 
 
of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerization? 44 (Oxford Martin 
Programme on Tech. and Emp., Working Paper, 2013), https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/ 
downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf (predicting that 47 percent of total US 
employment is in the high risk category, meaning that associated occupations are potentially 
automatable over some unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two); see also Ed 
Husic & Mike Priddis, Australia Unprepared for Automation of its Workforce, FIN. REV. (Jul. 
31, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.afr.com/technology/australia-unprepared-for-automation-
of-its-workforce-20170730-gxlwj5 [https://perma.cc/X4LH-8ZBK]. But see CTR. FOR THE 
NEW ECON. & SOC’Y, WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF JOBS REPORT 2018 viii (2018), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2018.pdf (estimating that AI, 
automation and robotics will create 58 million net jobs between 2018 and 2022); Melanie 
Arntz, Terry Gregory & Ulrich Zierahn, The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: 
A Comparative Analysis, (OECD Soc., Working Paper No. 189, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1787/ 
1815199X (arguing that estimates of job losses are exaggerated); Michael Koch, Ilya 
Manuylov, & Marcel Smolka, Robots and Firms, (CESifo Working Paper No. 7608, 2019), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198968/1/cesifo1_wp7608.pdf (finding that robot 
adoption leads to net job creation). 
22 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 156. 
23 See, e.g., Sam Mitha, Robots, Technological Change and Taxation, TAX J. (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.taxjournal.com/articles/robots-technological-change-and-taxation-14092017 
(former head of Central Tax Policy Group at Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs; “Unless 
corporate profits were to increase very substantially indeed, it would be necessary for the 
government to increase the corporation tax rate by a significant amount to recoup the personal 
tax revenues lost through automation.”). 
24 Mady Delvaux (Rapporteur), Comm. on Legal Affairs, Report with Recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, E.U.  DOC. A8-0005/2017 (Jan. 1, 2017). 
25 Id. at 4. 
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The recommendation noted that the development of robotics and AI 
raised “concerns about the future of employment, the viability of 
social welfare and security systems and the continued lag in pension 
contributions, if the current basis of taxation is maintained, creating 
the potential for increased inequality in the distribution of wealth and 
influence.”26 The corrective for these risks was identified as “the 
likelihood of levying tax on the work performed by a robot or a fee for 
using and maintaining a robot should be examined in the context of 
funding the support and retraining of unemployed workers whose jobs 
have been reduced or eliminated.”27 
 
The EU robot tax proposal gained early support from a high profile 
source. In a controversial interview with Quartz magazine shortly after 
the proposal was publicized, Bill Gates endorsed a proposal for a tax 
on robots.28 Other prominent figures soon announced their support for 
the Gates robot tax idea. For example, Robert Shiller, Nobel laureate 
in economics known for predicting the 2008 financial crisis,29 
endorsed a “moderate tax on robots” as a “natural component of a 
policy to address rising inequality.”30 Elon Musk31 and Stephen 
Hawking32 also joined the fray. 
Others were decidedly less keen. The International Federation of 
Robotics took a strong stand against robot taxes, noting that such a tax 
 
 
 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates, 
QUARTZ (Feb.17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-
should-pay-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/H8RR-UCN5]. 
29 Robert J. Shiller, Bubble Trouble, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Sept. 17, 2007), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bubble-trouble?barrier=accesspaylog 
[https://perma.cc/72U9-TGRQ]. 
30 Robert J. Shiller, Robotization Without Taxation?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/temporary-robot-tax-finances-adjustment-by-
robert-j--shiller-2017-03?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/479B-BHRG]. 
31 Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk: Robots Will Take Your Jobs, Government Will Have to Pay 
Your Wage, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2016, 2:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/04/elon-musk-
robots-will-take-your-jobs-government-will-have-to-pay-your-wage.html. 
32 Doug Bolton, Stephen Hawking Says Robots Could Make Us All Rich and Free—But We're 
More Likely to End Up Poor and Unemployed, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2015, 6:35 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/stephen-hawking-says-robots-
could-make-us-all-rich-and-free-but-were-more-likely-to-end-up-poor-and-a6688431.html 
[https://perma.cc/N5KM-PAED]. 
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would “have a negative impact on competitiveness and 
employment.”33 So did European politicians like former Greek finance 
minister Yanis Varoufakis34 and EU Commissioner Andrus Ansip,35 as 
well as former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers.36 After 
considerable debate, the final version of the motion proposed by MEP 
Delvaux and adopted by the European Parliament contained no 
reference to a potential robot tax.37 
 
Despite this setback, support for robot tax proposals has increased 
globally.38 While most of these endorsements have come from the left 
of the political spectrum,39 some in the political right have also 
favorably discussed robot tax proposals.40 
 
 
 
 
33 Press Release, Int’l Fed’n Robotics, World Robotics Federation IFR: Why Bill Gates’ Robot 
Tax Is Wrong (Feb. 27, 2017), https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/world-robotics-
federation-ifr-why-bill-gates-robot-tax-is-wrong [https://perma.cc/AM7B-ATEP?type=image]; 
see also Steve Cousins, Is a ‘Robot Tax’ Really an ‘Innovation Penalty’?, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 
22, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/22/save-the-robots-from-taxes/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZV2-RDLY]; cf. Tshilidzi Marwala, On Robot Revolution and Taxation 
(Aug. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.01666.  
34 Yanis Varoufakis, A Tax on Robots?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 26, 2017), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bill-gates-tax-on-robots-by-yanis-varoufakis-
2017-02?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/2CX2-F3NT]. 
35 Kate Samuelson, EU Commissioner Says No to Bill Gates’ Robot Tax Idea, FORTUNE (June 
2, 2017, 9:07 AM),  http://fortune.com/2017/06/02/andrus-ansip-bill-gates-robot-tax/ 
[https://perma.cc/8LHG-M4NZ]. 
36 Sarah Kessler, Lawrence Summers Says Bill Gates’ Idea for a Robot Tax is ‘Profoundly 
Misguided,’ QUARTZ (Mar. 6, 2017), https://qz.com/925412/lawrence-summers-says-bill-
gates-idea-for-a-robot-tax-is-profoundly-misguided/ [https://perma.cc/UTM4-MP9Z]. 
37 Civil Law Rules on Robotics, E.U. DOC. P8_TA(2017)0051 (Feb. 16, 2017); Georgina 
Prodhan, European Parliament Calls for Robot Law, Rejects Robot Tax, THOMAS REUTERS 
(Feb. 16, 2017, 2:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robots-
lawmaking/european-parliament-calls-for-robot-law-rejects-robot-tax-idUSKBN15V2KM. 
38 Mazur, supra note 6, at 297. 
39 See, e.g., Cheryl Chan, Green Party’s Elizabeth May Proposes ‘Robot Tax’ to Prepare for 
Future of Automation, VANCOUVER SUN (Sept. 30, 2019), https://vancouversun.com/news/ 
local-news/green-partys-elizabeth-may-proposes-robot-tax-to-prepare-for-future-of-
automation [https://perma.cc/M37Q-UNHT]; Ewin Hannah, ‘Robot Tax’ to Help Retrain 
Displaced Workers, THE AUSTRALIAN (Dec. 13, 2018, 12:09 AM), https://www.theaustralian 
.com.au/nation/labor-plans-robot-tax-to-help-retrain-displaced-workers/news-
story/966b5534e8a68239a727a783a66e731a; Gordon Rayner, Jeremy Corbyn Plans to ‘Tax 
Robots’ Because Automation is a ‘Threat’ to Workers, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26, 2017, 10:00 
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/26/jeremy-corbyn-plans-tax-robots-
automation-threat-workers/ [https://perma.cc/M5BT-ZGMK]; Marie Théobald, Taxe sue les 
Robots, Revenue Universel, Énergie . . . Benoît Hamon Détaille son Programme Économique 
[Tax on Robots, Universal Income, Energy . . . Benoît Hamon Details his Economic Program], 
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Proposals have also surfaced in the United States. In 2018, Jane Kim, a 
candidate for mayor of San Francisco, ran on a platform that included 
a tax on AI, robots, and algorithms displacing human workers.41 A 
political candidate in Chicago, Ameya Pawar, has proposed ordinances 
clawing back relocation subsidies given to companies who fail to 
create the promised number of jobs due to automation and imposing a 
tax on companies who replace human employees with automation, in 
the amount of the annual salary of the displaced workers.42 
The most recent high-profile endorsement of the concept of a robot tax 
came from U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.43 Rep. 
Ocasio-Cortez suggested in a speech at SXSW that a tax rate of 90% 
on businesses using robots may be necessary, referencing Mr. Gates’ 
robot tax proposal.44 At least two U.S. presidential candidates in the 
2020 Democratic primary have explicitly adopted a robot tax 
proposal.45 
 
LE FIGARO ÉCONOMIQUE (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:39 AM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2017/ 
03/03/20002-20170303ARTFIG00144-taxe-sur-les-robots-revenu-universel-energie8230-
benoit-hamon-detaille-son-programme-economique.php [https://perma.cc/G5U4-DW5W].  
40 See, e.g., Federica Meta, Tassa sui Robot, si Riapre il Dibattito, Salvini: ‘Imposta a Tutela 
del Lavoro:’ [Tax on the Robots, the Debate Reopens, Salvini: ‘Tax to Protect Labor’], 
CORCOM (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/elezioni-2018/tassa-sui-robot-
si-riapre-dibattito-salvini-imposta-tutela-del-lavoro/ [https://perma.cc/X46F-SHG4] 
(discussing independent robot tax proposals made by Deputy and Italian Socialist Party 
member Oreste Pastorelli and Deputy Prime Minister and Lega party member Matteo Salvini). 
41 See also About Us, JOBS FOR THE FUTURE FUND, https://www.jobsofthefuturefund.com 
/about/ [https://perma.cc/BQ4U-WUNV]; Emily Price, Bill Gates' Plan to Tax Robots Could 
Become a Reality in San Francisco, FORTUNE (Sept. 5, 2017, 3:57 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2017/09/05/san-francisco-robot-tax/.  
42 Fran Spielman, Pawar Proposes Claw-back Clause, Robot Tax to Guard Against Amazon 
Automation, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Feb 12, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/2/ 
12/18314110/pawar-proposes-claw-back-clause-robot-tax-to-guard-against-amazon-
automation [https://perma.cc/2XZ6-M48U]. 
43 Jeffry Bartash, Bill Gates Finds an Ally in Washington for his Idea to Tax Robots: 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 11, 2019, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bill-gates-finds-an-ally-in-washington-for-his-idea-to-
tax-robots-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-2019-03-11 [https://perma.cc/X9KX-S2P5]; SXSW, 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez | SXSW 2019, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JU-SE5eNt04 (The robot tax discussion begins at 57:40). 
44 SXSW, supra note 43, at 57:40. 
45 Bill De Blasio, Why American Workers Need to Be Protected from Automation, WIRED 
(Sept. 5, 2019, 3:16 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-american-workers-need-to-be-
protected-from-automation/ [https://perma.cc/2EBH-L9DZ]; Team Delaney, Delaney Releases 
Living Wage Plan to Increase Take Home Pay, Create Universal Paid Family Leave, 
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V. Challenges with Robot Tax Proposals 
 
While there have been many proposals for a robot tax, few of those 
proposals include any specifics about how such a tax would be 
implemented or administered. Put bluntly, “[t]he enthusiasm of robot 
tax proponents is matched by the lack of detail on how such a tax 
would work.”46 There is good reason for this omission: while broad 
policy statements about taxing robots is easy, addressing the many 
practical challenges of such taxes is much more difficult. As Professor 
Mazur has put it, “these proposals involve substantial elements of 
arbitrariness and complexity in implementation, likely increasing 
compliance and administrative burdens on companies and tax 
authorities.”47 The most significant hurdles are discussed below. 
a. What is a robot? 
 
There is a fundamental definitional problem plaguing robot tax 
proposals: what is a taxable robot?48 “Few complex technologies have 
a single, stable, uncontested definition. Robots are no exception.”49 
This is a significant problem for dealing with robots in a legal context 
and not unique to tax.50 To be sure, there are various technical 
definitions that attempt to define what a robot is.51 While the details 
 
DELANEY FOR PRESIDENT 2020 (June 21, 2019), https://www.johndelaney.com/2019/06/21/ 
delaney-releases-living-wage-plan-to-increase-take-home-pay-create-universal-paid-family-
leave/ [https://perma.cc/KXS5-UE7H].  
46 Robert J. Kovacev, Don’t Tax the Robots, S. F. CHRONICLE (Jan. 21, 2018, 5:21 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Don-t-tax-the-robots-12511631.php 
[https://perma.cc/TQJ6-HSEV]. For a rare example of a robot tax proponent willing to grapple 
with such details see OBERSON, supra note 2, at 112-137. 
47 Mazur, supra note 6, at 303. 
48 Id. at 299. Even scholars who are generally favorably disposed to the concept of the robot 
tax concede the challenge posed by this basic definitional problem. See, e.g., Xavier Oberson, 
How Taxing Robots Could Help Bridge Future Revenue Gaps, OECD (2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/how-taxing-robots-could-help-bridge-future-revenue-
gaps.htm [https://perma.cc/3FMH-SZQH] (“clear and agreed definition of robots would be 
required”). 
49 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513, 529 (2015). 
50 See, e.g., Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 397 (2004); Raymond Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Copyright and Software 
Technology Infringement: Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13 (1986).  
51 See Oberson, supra note 6, at 249-250. 
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vary, the “common thread is that they tend to focus on the autonomy 
and decision-making process of robots.”52 These technical definitions, 
while they may be useful in a scientific context, would do little to 
assist a lay judge or tax administrator without a technical background. 
The European Union tried its hand at determining a “common 
definition of smart autonomous robots” to include the following 
characteristics: “acquires autonomy through sensors and/or by 
exchanging data with its environment (inter-connectivity) and trades 
and analyses data; is self-learning (optional criterion); has a physical 
support; [and] adapts its behaviours and actions to its environment.”53 
Despite this attempt, the EU recognized that “defining robots is no 
easy task in the absence of any real consensus within the global 
scientific community.”54 In sum, there simply is no commonly-
accepted legal definition of a “robot.”55  
  
The definitional problem is simply one manifestation of the difficulty 
judges (and by extension, tax authorities, taxpayers, and tax 
professionals) have in dealing with inanimate objects that exhibit 
features of autonomy that we commonly associate with robots. A 
bizarre example of the gymnastics required to address the tax 
implications of robots comes from, of all places, Chuck E. Cheese.56 
At the time, Maryland gave its counties the authority to impose an 
admissions and amusement tax on the gross receipts of entities 
providing “refreshment, service or merchandise at any roof garden, 
cabaret or similar place where there is furnished a performance.”57 
Chuck E. Cheese is a “family dining and entertainment center” 
 
 
 
 
52 Id. at 250. 
53 Comm. on Legal Affairs, European Civil Law Rules in Robotics: Study, E.U. DOC. PE 
571.379, 8 (2016). 
54 Id. 
55 Mazur, supra note 6, at 298-99; Oberson, supra note 6, at 249-250; Ryan Calo, Robots in 
American Law (Univ.. Wash. Sch. L., Research. Paper No. 2016-04 (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2737598; Kovacev, supra note 6.  
56 Comptroller of the Treasury v. Family Entm’t Ctrs., 519 A.2d 1337 (Md. 1987), overruled 
on other grounds by 318 N. Market St., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 554 A.2d 453 
(Md. 1989). Thanks to Professor Calo for suggesting this example. 
57 MD. CODE ANN., ART. 81 § 402(A) (1957). The current successor statute uses the term 
“entertainment” instead of “performance.” MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. § 4-101 (2017). There 
are no subsequent judicial decisions analyzing whether this statutory change would change the 
result for Chuck E. Cheese. 
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including , among other amusements, an animatronic Chuck E. 
Cheese, an “iconic, energetic mouse mascot, performs music and 
entertainment shows along with his friends, providing free 
entertainment to our guests and driving strong brand recognition.”58 
The Maryland Comptroller of Treasury assessed this tax against the 
owner of three Chuck E. Cheese restaurants in the state, alleging that 
the performance of Chuck E. Cheese and his animatronic friends 
constituted a performance for purposes of the admissions and 
amusement tax statute. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
disagreed, based on its interpretation of the term “performance:” 
 
According to Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 
(2d edition, 1983), one definition of the word “performance,” 
among others clearly less applicable, is “(4) a formal exhibition 
of skill or talent as a play, musical program, etc.; a show.” We 
recognize that “performance,” as used in § 402(a), has 
connotations of inherent human input that leaves room for 
spontaneous imperfections during the exhibition of skill or 
talent. A “performance” is a method to measure human skill or 
talent. In other words, a pre-programmed robot can perform a 
menial task but, because a pre-programmed robot has no “skill” 
and therefore leaves no room for spontaneous human flaw in an 
exhibition, it cannot “perform” a piece of music anymore than 
can a jukebox. Just as a wind-up toy does not perform for 
purposes of § 402(a), neither does a pre-programmed 
mechanical robot. 
 
Appellees' mechanical puppets are designed to give the 
impression that they are performing; however, because there is 
no human skill necessary in their control, there is no 
“performance.”59 
 
 
 
 
 
58 CEC ENTERTAINMENT, INC., FISCAL 2018 FORM 10-K 5 (2018). To parents who have raised 
children in the United States over the past 40 years, this particular iconic, energetic mouse 
mascot needs no introduction, for better or worse. 
59 Family Entm’t Ctrs, 519 A.2d at 1339; cf. Louis Marx & Co. v. United States, 66 Cust. Ct. 
139, 142 (1971) (mechanical robots are not “figures or images of animate objects” for 
purposes of the Tariff Act of 1930). 
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If you accept that Chuck E. Cheese and friends are little more than 
glorified jukeboxes, then this decision seems reasonable. Yet, robots 
and AI are capable of much more sophisticated tasks than replaying 
canned tunes for pizza-fueled children’s birthday parties. As Professor 
Calo points out, robots increasingly engage in emergent behavior that 
displays the “ability or tendency of a system to behave in complex, 
unanticipated ways.60 Would the result be different if the cybernetic 
mouse could compose its own music, choose what songs to perform 
and reflect a unique style in performing it? It is not at all clear that 
judges will have the technical knowledge to make the distinction 
between a simple machine and an emergent-behavior robot.61 Even if 
they did, it is unlikely that a bright-line rule could separate robots from 
mere machines. Resolving that question would therefore revolve 
around the facts and circumstances of each particular case. There is no 
reason to expect tax authorities, taxpayers, or tax professionals to have 
better luck managing that difficult task.62 
 
So, when discussing a robot tax, does a “robot” refer to any labor-
saving machine (say, an ATM), or something more complex? What 
degree of autonomy (or emergent behavior, if you prefer) must it 
exhibit? Does it include an intangible algorithm embedded in code, or 
must it be a physical actor? Does it include a machine that enhances 
rather than replaces human activity?63 Any robot tax must answer 
these questions, and reduce that language to statutory text. From a 
practitioner’s standpoint, the difficulty in nailing down such a basic 
element creates compliance nightmares and planning opportunities, 
and is not a sound basis for an administrable tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 227 (2016). 
61 Id. at 229-31.  
62 Consider, for example, the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor 
for employment tax purposes has been “riven with controversy and ambiguity” for decades 
and promises to remain so. Kovacev, supra note 6. If a tax authority has difficulty sorting that 
out after repeated iterations and disputes, it is difficult to imagine a smooth interpretation and 
implementation of the definition of an emerging and evolving technology. 
63 See, e.g., Signe Brewster, This $40,000 Robotic Exoskeleton Lets the Paralyzed Walk, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/546276/this-40000-robotic-
exoskeleton-lets-the-paralyzed-walk/ [https://perma.cc/Q7V7-GAKS].   
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b. Who actually pays the tax? 
 
There is an even more fundamental problem with robot taxes: robots 
do not pay taxes, rather, humans (or entities formed and controlled by 
humans) do. Robots do not own property, nor do they earn wages. 
Should a robot collect money, it does so on behalf of its human owner, 
and legally must do so in the name of that human agent.64 The Internal 
Revenue Code defines a taxpayer as “an individual, a trust, estate, 
partnership, association, company or corporation.”65 A robot is none of 
those things, at least under present law. A “robot tax” is really a tax on 
humans (or entities formed and run by humans) who own, use, or 
benefit from the use of robots.66  
 
It has been proposed that robots be granted a separate legal 
personality, akin to a corporate entity, that would be charged with 
paying taxes.67 In reality, this would not change the analysis of who 
pays the tax, however. Calling a robot a person via a legal fiction does 
not change the fact that the money paying the tax must, in substance, 
come from and be controlled by human actors.68 Further, there are 
 
 
 
 
64 Oberson, supra note 6, at 260.  
65 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1), (14) (1992). 
66 At common law, an inanimate object could be held responsible for the death of a human, 
and the object “forfeited to the Crown as a deodand.” Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1973) (citation omitted). There does not appear to be a common-law 
equivalent to holding an inanimate object independently liable for taxes, however, even if 
taxes are sometimes erroneously described that way. For example, a real property tax may be 
described as a “tax on land,” but the tax is actually paid by the owners of the land, not the land 
itself. See, e.g., JOAN M. YOUNGMAN, CHAPTER 9: TAX ON LAND AND BUILDINGS, in 1 TAX LAW 
DESIGN AND DRAFTING 264 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996); cf. Automatic Vending Sales Co. v. 
City of Johnstown, 19 Pa. D. & C. 474 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1933) (invalidating ordinance 
that purported to impose a license tax upon vending machines; “literally construed [the 
ordinance] would subject these robots to fine and imprisonment upon noncompliance with its 
terms.”) 
67 OBERSON, supra note 2, at 17-24.  
68 An in rem action may be maintained nominally against an item of property (such as a ship 
under admiralty law or property subject to forfeiture). See FED. RS. CIV. P. A-G. This is 
properly understood as a device allowing the determination of rights of persons to the 
property, however, not a vesting of legal personhood on the property itself. See, e.g., Tyler v. 
Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76-77 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, C.J.) (“All 
proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. . . . Personification and naming the res 
as defendant are mere symbols, not the essential matter. They are fictions, conveniently 
expressing the nature of the process and the result; nothing more.”) 
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considerable difficulties in holding such an artificial legal “person” 
accountable for its actions, leading to potential moral and ethical 
objections.69  
 
There are important policy ramifications to choosing which humans 
would pay the tax. Either the tax is imposed on: (1) the manufacturers 
of robots, (2) the businesses purchasing the robots, or (3) on 
consumers of goods or services provided by robots. The incidence of a 
robot tax varies with the type of tax employed and it is not always 
clear who ultimately bears the incidence of taxation. Most obvious is a 
sales tax, value-added tax, excise tax or use tax imposed at the retail 
level on products produced or services provided by AI, robotics, or 
automation.70 Clearly, the consumer pays those taxes. For other taxes, 
the ultimate bearer of the tax burden is less clear.71  
 
A popular proposal involves taxing robots in the equivalent amount to 
the foregone taxes of displaced employees.72 This assumes, of course, 
 
 
 
 
69 See Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis, & Thomas D. Grant, Of, for, and by the 
People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 273 
(2017). 
70 See, e.g., Alexis Carey, MPs Want Shoppers to be Charged a Self-checkout Machine Tax, 
NEWS.COM.AU (May 21, 2019, 9:20 PM), https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/retail/ 
mps-want-shoppers-to-be-charged-a-selfcheckout-machine-tax/news-story/ 
78e9353a938bb9cf117f5935ce1521ed [https://perma.cc/CZ3P-C7Q3]. 
71 An analogy can be drawn to the question of who bears the burden of corporate taxes. The 
incidence of corporate taxation is a highly controversial subject. See, e.g., Clemens Fuest, 
Andreas Peichl & Sebastian Siegloch, The Incidence of Corporate Taxation and its 
Implications for Tax Progressivity, VOX: CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://voxeu.org/article/incidence-corporate-taxation-and-implications-tax-progressivity 
[https://perma.cc/HG2H-X8SP]. 
72 FAQs, JOBS OF THE FUTURE FUND, https://www.jobsofthefuturefund.com/faq/ 
[https://perma.cc/W9KG-7X3R]; see also OBERSON, supra note 2, at 114 (proposing a tax 
based on an “imputed salary” allocated to robots, based on the equivalent salary paid to human 
workers for similar activities, analogous to the Swiss tax on “imputed rent” imposed on 
homeowners). “Imputed rent” is the theoretical income that homeowners enjoy as a result of 
not having to pay rent in order to live in their own homes. William Gale, Jonathan Gruber, & 
Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 155 TAX 
NOTES 1171, 1173 (2007). While the concept of imputed rent is mercifully absent from the 
United States’ tax code, see id. at 1173 n.3, a handful of European jurisdictions including 
Switzerland do tax imputed rent, notionally based on a valuation of market rent for similar 
properties minus associated expenses. Id.; see also Dan Andrews, Aida Caldera Sánchez & 
Åsa Johansson, Housing Markets and Structural Policies in OECD Countries 39, 43 (OECD 
Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 836, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1787/18151973. 
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that there is a demonstrable correspondence between acquiring a 
particular robot and lost human jobs. What if a business acquires a 
robot without firing any existing employees? Or lays off a number of 
low-skill employees but hires new skilled employees to work with the 
robot?73 Answering these questions would necessarily involve 
subjective judgment calls, inviting complexity and uncertainty from a 
tax administration perspective. This complexity and uncertainty would 
increase compliance costs for taxpayers, while creating opportunities 
for tax avoidance designed to exploit the ambiguities inherent in this 
proposal.74 
 
Another type of proposal calls for a tax based on income derived from 
AI, robots, or automation. Unless a business derives all its income 
from using robots, however, this would require some sort of allocation 
of income in order to calculate the tax. This would necessarily be a 
fact-driven case-by-case analysis, analogous to the analysis required in 
the context of transfer pricing.75 Transfer pricing is famously driven by 
complexity and costly disputes,76 and the same pattern would likely 
 
 
 
 
73 Mazur, supra note 6, at 302; Kovacev, supra note 6. 
74 See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 
489, 536-37 (2011). Regarding the analogy to “imputed rent,” see supra note 72, the 
experience with taxation of imputed rent in Switzerland is not encouraging. The tax on 
imputed rents incentivizes homeowners to hold large mortgages, inflate expenses, and 
undervalue the hypothetical imputed rent. As a result, the Swiss tax on imputed rents actually 
generates negative net tax revenues. Petar Vujanovic, Policies to Tame the Housing Cycle in 
Switzerland 22-23 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 1279, 2016), https://doi.org/ 
10.1787/18151973.  
75 “Whenever business transactions take place across the boundaries of two or more 
jurisdictions, there is a need to determine what portion of the income is subject to tax by each 
jurisdiction.” Masahiro Max Yoshimura, The ‘Tax War’ Between the United States and Japan 
Under Internal Revenue Code § 482: Is There a Solution?, 12 WISC. INT’L L.J. 401, 401-02 
(1994). Transfer pricing is the term for the process by which that allocation is made. In the 
United States, transfer pricing is governed by I.R.C. § 482 and attendant Treasury Regulations. 
76 See, e.g., Eaton Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C.M.. 2017-147 (2017); Medtronic, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
T.C. M. 2016-122 (2016), vacated and remanded, 900 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2018); Amazon.com, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 158 T.C. 108 (2017); Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), rev’d, 
2018 WL 3542989 (9th Cir. 2018), op. withdrawn, 898 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d by 
superseding op., 926 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019); Xilinx Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37 (2005), 
rev’d, 567 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 2009), op. withdrawn, 592 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d by 
superseding op, 598 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010); see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et. al., 
Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 
FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
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emerge if a robot tax required allocation of income between robot-
sourced and non-robot-sourced income.77 
An excise tax charged against the manufacturers or purchasers of 
robots is another possible approach. But there are also distributional 
effects to be considered. For example, such excise taxes would be 
regressive, because a business would pay the same amount of tax per 
robot no matter how large or profitable the business is.78 A small 
family business would likely be less able to absorb the cost of a per-
robot tax than a Fortune 500 company. 
 
c. Effects on innovation 
 
Robot tax proponents generally assume that the rise of AI, robotics, 
and automation will be a net negative for society, at least in the short 
run. The negative effects of robotization, particularly job displacement 
and increased economic inequality, have been characterized as 
negative externalities, like pollution or alcoholism.79 The assumption, 
therefore, is that a robot tax would be a Pigouvian tax,80 designed to 
disincentivize activities giving rise to the negative externalities.81 
 
 
 
 
77 An analogous proposal involves defining robots as separate “taxable persons” for purposes 
of a value-added tax (“VAT”), rather than as part of an enterprise, thereby adding an 
additional layer of VAT tax liability on any products and services involving a robot. OBERSON, 
supra note 2, at 87-111. This creates similar difficulties in allocating the value attributable to 
the robot, as opposed to the enterprise as a whole. 
78 A study by the Tax Policy Center concluded that excise taxes in general are regressive, 
“because both the share of income burdened by excises and the share of consumption spending 
on taxed goods and services is higher, on average, for lower income households.” JOSEPH 
ROSENBERG, TAX POLICY CENTER, THE DISTRIBUTIONAL BURDEN OF FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES 
15 (2015), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/distributional-burden-federal-excise-
taxes/full. 
79 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 152; Why Taxing Robots is Not a Good Idea, 
THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/ 
2017/02/25/why-taxing-robots-is-not-a-good-idea [https://perma.cc/REG2-KMUQ]. 
80 The term “Pigouvian tax” refers to a tax designed to impose costs on private actors who, in 
maximizing their own private gain, produce effects that are deleterious to society as a whole. 
A tax on the distribution of alcoholic beverages, which increases the cost of such beverages 
and therefore reduces consumption, is an example of such a tax. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 98-105 (4th prtg. 2010). The economic basis for the concept was first 
discussed by the economist Arthur C. Pigou, hence the term “Pigouvian tax.” 
81 See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 152; Ooi & Goh, supra note 4; see also 
Englisch, supra note 6, at 19. The recent proposal in the United Kingdom for a tax on 
shoppers using automated checkouts is premised in part on supposed loss of “valuable 
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What if that assumption is wrong? AI, robotics, and automation 
provide benefits to society, as even some robot tax proponents admit.82 
Indeed, as a general rule, technological advancement has led to 
increases in both employment and living standards, at least over the 
long term.83 Increasing the tax burden on the still-budding fields of AI 
and robotics could slow down the course of automation considerably, 
by increasing the cost of developing and deploying such 
technologies.84 As UK Business Minister Andrew Stephenson recently 
testified before a Parliamentary committee, robot taxes are “perverse,” 
precisely because they would disincentivize innovation.85 
 
d. Tax competition 
 
Robot taxes, imposed at any level short of universal global acceptance, 
gives rise to the potential for tax competition.86 A tax imposed on 
businesses in San Francisco may simply cause businesses to relocate 
their robots across the bay; a tax in California may cause moves to 
Nevada; a tax in the United States may cause moves to Mexico or 
China.87 This suggests that a global, multilateral solution would 
ultimately have to be found in order to impose an administrable robot 
tax. Easier said than done. 
 
 
everyday human contact” arising from use of those machines. SAM DALTON, ALL PARTY 
PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION, HEALING THE GENERATIONAL DIVIDE: 
INTERIM REPORT ON INTERGENERATIONAL CONNECTION 30 (2019), 
https://socialintegrationappg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/Healing-the-
Generational-Divide.pdf. 
82 See, e.g., Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 147 (“Automation has the potential to 
create widespread benefits. Not only will automation increase productivity, it will also 
improve safety and lead to new scientific breakthroughs.”). 
83 Ooi & Goh, supra note 4. 
84 Mazur, supra note 6, at 299-300. 
85 BUSINESS, ENERGY, AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE, ORAL EVIDENCE: AUTOMATION 
AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, 2019, HC 1093, at Q303 (UK),  http://data.parliament.uk/ 
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/business-energy-and-industrial-
strategy-committee/automation-and-the-future-of-work/oral/102291.pdf.  
86 See Mazur, supra note 6, at 300-01. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax 
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1574 (2000) 
(discussing tax competition). 
87 Kovacev, supra note 6.  
2020] KOVACEV 201 
 
 
The recent “digital tax” debate provides a useful illustration of this 
problem. One of the hallmarks of the modern economy is the 
prevalence of multinational corporations whose economic reach 
extends far beyond their country of origin, or even those countries 
where they have a physical presence.88 Many goods are tradeable 
across borders, and many services even more so due to the internet.89 
Historically, the lynchpin of international taxation has been that 
businesses may be taxed in a country only if they have a permanent 
establishment in that country.90 In the internet era, where goods and 
services can be ordered online from a company without any presence 
in the country, many businesses pay little or no tax in countries from 
which they derive considerable profits.91 Accordingly, the EU and 
several nations have proposed “digital tax” regimes that would tax the 
gross receipts or profits earned in jurisdictions where the business has 
no traditional permanent establishment.92 Discussions at the OECD-
level toward a consensus approach have continued for several years, 
but agreement seems elusive.93 A cross-border robot tax, imposing a 
 
 
 
 
88 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX 
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, 65-67 (2015), 
https://doi.org/10.1787/23132612.  
89 Id. at 66-67.  
90 See OECD, Commentary on Article 5: Concerning the Definition of Permanent 
Establishment, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED 
VERSION 116, 116 (10th ed. 2017); OECD, Commentary on Article 7: Concerning the Taation 
of Business Profits, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED 
VERSION 173, 173 (10th ed. 2017). 
91 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, supra note 88, at 79. 
92A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, at 8-
10, COM (2017) 547 final (Sept. 21, 2017).  
93 See, e.g., OECD Livestream, BEPS Public Consultation on the Tax Challenges of 
Digitalization, OECD (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-on-
tax-challenges-of-digitalisation-1-november-2017.htm; Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm. of 
Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, The Digitalized Economy: Selected Issues of 
Potential Relevance to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2017/6 (Aug. 8, 2017); 
Comm. of Experts on Int'l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax Challenges in the Digitalized 
Economy: Selected Issues for Possible Committee Consideration, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.18/2017/CPR.22 (Oct. 11, 2017); Stephanie Soong Johnston, Saint-Amans Warns Against 
Unilateral Moves to Tax Digital Economy, 87 TAX NOTES INT'L 1157 (2017); Tom O'Shea, 
The EU's Proposed “Significant Digital Presence” Framework, 90 TAX NOTES INT'L 1295 
(2018); Monica Gianni, OECD BEPS (In)Action 1: Factor Presence as a Solution to Tax 
Issues of the Digital Economy, 72 TAX LAW. 255 (2018); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the 
Treasury, Secretary Mnuchin Statement on Digital Economy Taxation Report (2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0316. The details of the various proposals for 
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tax related to the use of AI, robotics, and automation outside the taxing 
jurisdiction, poses the same challenges of lack of international 
consensus and difficulty of administration and enforcement.  
 
VI. Statutory Attempts at Robot Taxes 
 
While there are many advocates of robot tax proposals, actual 
legislative proposals are few and far between. To date, only a handful 
have actually been reduced to legislative language, as shown in the 
following sections. Each of these takes a different approach, 
illustrating both the variety of paths for a robot tax and the many 
pitfalls for such a tax. It is instructive to review these attempts to go 
beyond policy musings into actual legislation. 
 
a. South Korea 
 
The Republic of Korea has held the title of highest robot density in the 
world since 2010 – a record 710 robots per 10,000 employees in the 
manufacturing industry in 2017.94 In part, this is due to a generous tax 
regime specifically designed to promote automation. Article 24 of the 
Restriction of Special Taxation Act (“RTSA”) provides a tax credit for 
investment in “productivity increase facilities.”95 This is a literal tax 
credit for automation. That tax credit was 3% of the investment 
amount (7% for small or medium enterprises) against income tax or 
corporate tax.96 The automation tax credit has been extended many 
times since its initial enactment in order to “[s]upport job creation 
through furthering economic vitality.”97 
 
 
a digital tax regime, and the numerous challenges to implementing such a regime on a global 
basis, are beyond the scope of this article. 
94 INT’L FED’N OF ROBOTICS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY WORLD ROBOTICS 2018 INDUSTRIAL 
ROBOTS, 18 (2018), https://ifr.org/downloads/press2018/Executive_Summary_WR_2018_ 
Industrial_Robots.pdf.  
95 Restriction of Special Taxation Act, Act No. 11614, Jan. 1, 2014, art. 24(1) (S. Kor.), 
translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/ 
kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=27406&lang=ENG. 
96 Id.  
97 E.g., MINISTRY OF STRATEGY & FIN., KOREAN TAXATION 46, 55 (2012) (S. Kor.), 
https://www.nts.go.kr/eng/data/KOREANTAXATION2012.pdf. 
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The Act provides no definition for what constitutes a “productivity 
increase facility,” leaving that task to administrative guidance.98 The 
Presidential Decree enforcing the RTSA refers in turn to “facilities 
specified by Ordinance of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, in 
which investment is made for improving production process, 
automation of facilities, or informatization.”99 The Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance’s Decree in turn sets forth a laundry list of specific 
categories of equipment that qualify for the tax credit.100 The 
categories set forth in the Ordinance include such items as computer-
aided manufacturing (CAM) and computer-aided design (CAD) 
devices, process control systems, and warehouse loading equipment.101  
In 2017, the administration of President Moon Jae-in announced its 
intention to reduce the automation tax credit, in response to which 
legislation was enacted by the National Assembly in early 2018.102 
This announcement received much attention in the press, where it was 
frequently hailed (incorrectly) as a robot tax instead of a reduction in a 
tax benefit for automation.103 Press reports indicated that the proposal 
was motivated by a desire to slow the implementation of automation in 
Korea’s high-tech manufacturing sector.104 Under the new law, the 
automation tax credit was reduced by two percentage points, and the 
 
 
 
 
98 Id. (“Facilities prescribed by Presidential Decree which belong to those for the improvement 
and automation of processes”). 
99 Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, Presidential Decree No. 
26070, Feb. 3, 2015, art. 21(2) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute 
online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=43444&type=sogan& 
key=5. 
100 Enforcement Rule of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, Ministry of Economy and 
Finance Decree No. 614, Mar. 17, 2017, art. 12(1) (S. Kor.), Translated in Korea Legislation 
Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq= 
48860&type=sogan&key=5. 
101 Id. at tbl.2.  
102 Korea’s Robot Tax, 3 ROBOTICS L. J. 1 (Aug. 24, 2017); Yoon Sung-won, Korea Takes 
First Step to Introduce ‘Robot Tax,’ KOREA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.koreatimes.co. 
kr/www/news/tech/2017/08/133_234312.html [https://perma.cc/Z2X5-7XEH]. 
103 Korea’s Robot Tax, supra note 102; Yoon, supra note 102; see also Greg Nichols, South 
Korea Mulling World’s First Robot Tax, ZDNET (Aug. 9, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.zdnet. 
com/article/south-korea-mulling-worlds-first-robot-tax/ [https://perma.cc/5Z4G-YV27]. 
Unfortunately, this error has been propagated widely in academic and journalistic circles. 
104 South Korea Considers Amending Tax Laws to Slow Speed of Automation, E&T (Aug. 10, 
2017), https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2017/08/south-korea-considers-amending-tax-
laws-to-slow-speed-of-automation/ [https://perma.cc/53YN-U7GZ].  
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sunset date extended from December 31, 2017 until December 31, 
2019.105 
 
The Korean approach is almost unique, due to the prior existence of an 
explicit automation tax credit.106 Korea’s solution to the definitional 
problem is to create a white list, setting forth every single category that 
qualifies with specificity. This makes some sense for a tax credit, as to 
which a taxpayer must establish that it is entitled to the claimed tax 
benefit. Further, the taxpayer has an incentive to self-identify and will 
seek an expansive definition of the items of the list. For imposing a 
tax, the incentive goes the other way, and there would be a 
considerable resource cost for a tax authority to keep abreast of the 
latest technology to include on that list without taxpayers clamoring to 
get that new technology added. 
 
There is some anecdotal evidence that the reduction in the automation 
tax credit has slowed investment in robotics, new industrial robot 
installations in Korea decreased in 2017 for the first time since 
2012.107 Whether this reflects a causative effect of the reduction in the 
automation tax credit is unclear. At any rate, Korea remains the most-
automated economy in the world and there is no indication of 
widespread abandonment of AI, robotics, or automation. 
 
b. Italy 
 
In 2017, a Socialist deputy in the Chamber of Deputies filed the first 
European robot tax bill.108 The proposal was to increase the corporate 
 
 
 
 
105 2018 Tax Amendments in Effect, DELOITTE: TAX@HAND (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.taxathand.com/article/9020/Korea/2018/2018-tax-amendments-in-effect 
[https://perma.cc/S3NB-A7SF]. 
106 South Korea is not the only jurisdiction with an automation tax credit. North Dakota 
recently enacted a tax credit “for purchases of manufacturing machinery and equipment for the 
purpose of automating manufacturing processes in this state to improve job quality or increase 
productivity.” N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-01.36 (2019). 
107 INT’L FED’N OF ROBOTICS, supra note 94, at 14. The South Korean government recently 
announced plans to reverse course and increase the tax incentive in light of slowed economic 
growth. Jung Min-kyung, Korea to Raise Tax Credit Rate for Corporate Facility Investments, 
R&D, KOREA HERALD (July 25, 2019, 4:43 PM), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud 
=20190725000653 [https://perma.cc/VTB2-QJLJ]. 
108 Proposta di Legge 3 agosto 2017, n.4621 (It.). 
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income tax rate by 1% for companies “if the production activity of the 
company is implemented and managed predominantly from artificial 
intelligence systems and robotics.”109 Interestingly, the rate increase is 
abated for a company that invests at least 0.5% of its revenues each 
year in professional requalification projects.110 It appears this bill was 
referred to committee in the Chamber of Deputies with no further 
action taken.111  
 
The legislation provides no definition of “artificial intelligence 
systems” or “robotics.” Nor does it suggest any methods by which the 
Italian tax authority would determine whether a company’s production 
activity was “predominantly” implemented and managed by AI or 
robotics. This opens the door to definitional problems as to what 
constitutes an AI system or robot. It also creates compliance and 
enforcement headaches, because taxpayers and the tax authority would 
somehow have to allocate every company’s production activity 
between AI/robotics versus human activity. While no doubt the tax 
authority would propose regulations and guidance interpreting this 
legislation had it been enacted, the breadth and ambiguity of the 
language would make that a Herculean task.  
 
Further, there is nothing in this legislation that would impose a tax on 
businesses outside Italy (or otherwise not subject to Italian corporate 
tax). The tax would burden Italian businesses, while doing nothing to 
prevent competing businesses in other countries from adopting AI and 
robotics in order to gain a competitive advantage. (by lowering process 
or increasing efficiency). Jobs would still be lost, but to foreign 
competition instead of domestic robots. 
 
c. Geneva 
 
 
 
 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 OPENPOLIS, C.4621: Tax Benefits for the Use of Artificial Intelligence Systems in the 
Production of Goods, OPENPARLAMENTO, https://parlamento17.openpolis.it/singolo_atto/88576 
[https://perma.cc/6MLP-NBW8] (tracking the progress of bill introduced to Chamber by the 
Honorable Oreste Pastorelli).  
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Another example comes from the Grand Council of the canton of 
Geneva, Switzerland.112 In 2017, members of the Grand Council 
proposed legislation “for the maintenance of employment, quality and 
locality in the retail sector (introduction of a tax on automated 
cashiers).”113 Under this proposal, retail stores would be assessed a tax 
of 10,000 Swiss francs per month (roughly equivalent to $10,000 in 
U.S. dollars at current exchange rates)114 for each automated cashier 
installed in the store. An automated cashier is defined as “any device 
for the payment of purchases that the customer can use without the 
intervention of store personnel.”115 A store subject to the tax may 
reduce its tax liability by multiplying 10% of its tax base by a ratio 
between the number of monthly hours of operation by human 
employees operating cashiers over the total number of monthly hours 
of operation for all types of cashiers (with the assumption that 
automated cashiers are in operation for the entire time the store is 
open).116 
 
The tax would be paid to a newly-formed Geneva Foundation for 
Trade and Local Employment, which in turn would pay out 30% of the 
taxes (net of the Foundation’s expenses) to a preexisting foundation 
for vocational and continuing education, and 70% as a subsidy to 
stores with no automated cashiers.117 The Foundation would be given 
the power to issue fines for noncompliance as well as recover unpaid 
taxes.118 There is also a potential 5-year prison sentence for 
noncompliance, which may be the first example of a proposed criminal 
 
 
 
 
112 PROJET DE LOI [PL] [PROPOSED LAW] Feb. 22, 2017, PL 12064 (Switz.), http://ge.ch/ 
grandconseil/data/texte/PL12064.pdf. I am grateful to Xavier Oberson for bringing the Geneva 
legislation to my attention. 
113 Id.  
114 Swiss Francs to United States Dollar, XE: CURRENCY CONVERTER, https://www.xe.com/ 
currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=CHF&To=USD (follow hyperlink; then type 
“10000” into box and press yellow enter button) (last visited July 9, 2019). 
115 PROPOSED LAW, PL 12064, art. 7 (Switz.). 
116 Id. art. 10. 
117 Id. art. 3, 5. 
118 Id. art. 15. 
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sanction in connection with a robot tax.119 This proposal was 
ultimately sent to committee, and no further action has been taken.120  
This proposal addressed the definitional problem by being narrowly 
targeted to a specific type of automation – automated cashiers – for 
which it was able to provide a reasonably precise definition. It also 
attempts to create a direct link between the tax and remediation of job 
displacement costs, which is an oft-stated goal of robot tax proponents. 
Nonetheless, the result of the tax, had it been enacted, would have 
been to slow innovation while raising prices on consumers and 
essentially creating a class of employees dependent on a government 
foundation and a tax on automation for their livelihood.121 Nor is it 
clear that Geneva’s cashiers are uniquely threatened by automation or 
otherwise more deserving than employees in other occupations. 
 
d. United States Autonomous Vehicle Tax Legislation 
 
While there has been extensive talk from various politicians in the 
United States about a robot tax, there have been few proposals actually 
reduced to legislative language. Indeed, the only such examples in the 
United States to date deal with one specific type of automation: 
autonomous vehicles.122 
 
 
 
 
119 Id. art 16. 
120 République et canton de Genève, Séance du Jeudi 16 Mars 2017 À 17h, PL 12054 [Session 
Thursday, March 16, 2017 at 17H], Grand Conseil: Mémorial, http://ge.ch/grandconseil/ 
memorial/seances/010401/1/14/#1562618 (explaining that Bill 12054 was sent without debate 
to the Committee on the Economy) (last visited July 9, 2019) (Switz.).  
121 See Jürg Müller, Eine Robotersteuer ist Unsinn [A Robot Tax is Nonsense], NEUE ZÜRCHER 
ZEITUNG (Aug. 22, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/science-fiction-im-
steuerrecht-eine-robotersteuer-istunsinn-ld.1312133 [https://perma.cc/4GWH-QY6D] (Switz.). 
122 For a survey of autonomous vehicle legislation in general in the United States, see Rustin 
Diehl & Matthew L. Thue, Autonomous Vehicle Testing Legislation: A Review of Best 
Practices from States on the Cutting Edge, 21 U. FLA. J. TECH. & POL’Y 197 (2017). There is 
also an emerging debate on the taxation of unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e., drones). Pending 
legislation in Washington State would impose the existing aircraft excise tax on drones. See 
S.B. 5137, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); see also Haye Kestelco, Boulder City, Nev. 
Wants to Charge Recreational and Commercial Drone Pilots $25/$100 Per Day, DRONE DJ 
(Mar. 16, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://dronedj.com/2018/03/16/boulder-city-nevada-drone-charge/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZG4L-KBLY] (proposed municipal tax on UAVs). These proposals are not 
directed at autonomous drones in particular, however, so they are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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In many ways, autonomous vehicles provide a microcosm of the 
revenue effects that governments will face if automation becomes the 
norm.123 The United States uses a per-gallon tax that pays into a 
Highway Trust Fund to fund road infrastructure.124 Autonomous 
vehicles promise to be more fuel-efficient, and many are also intended 
to be fully electric. An electric autonomous vehicle may pay no tax at 
all, even though it adds to the wear and tear of the highway system as 
much as a conventional car. It is not necessarily the case that revenues 
will decrease with the rise of autonomous vehicles.125 A study 
conducted by the Conservation Law Foundation on the economic and 
fiscal impact of autonomous vehicles in Massachusetts concluded that 
privately owned autonomous vehicles may actually lead to higher 
municipal tax revenues from excise taxes. While there may be a state-
level decrease in gas tax revenues that reduction would depend on the 
adoption of electric vehicle technology. Alternatively a gasoline-
powered autonomous vehicle could actually increase gas tax 
revenues.126 Nonetheless, policymakers have attempted to address this 
perceived problem before autonomous vehicles are widely adopted.  
 
There have been discussions of many alternatives to autonomous 
vehicles. For example, a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee has been 
proposed, charging a per-mile fee to fund public infrastructure 
investments.127 To date, however, California and Nevada are the only 
two jurisdictions in the United States that have enacted legislation 
providing for the taxation of autonomous vehicles, specifically in the 
 
 
 
 
123 See generally Stephen Ratner, Taxation of Autonomous Vehicles in Cities and States, 71 
TAX. LAW. 1051 (2018).  
124 I.R.C. § 9503 (2019). 
125 Many of the supposed negative revenue effects for autonomous vehicles are really based on 
the assumption that they will be electric, not gas-powered. This begs the question whether a 
tax on electric vehicles (whether autonomous or human-driven) would be a superior 
alternative to a tax on autonomous vehicles.  
126 RAFAEL MARES, CHRIS STIX, & SARA DEWEY, CONSERVATION LAW FOUND., HOW 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES WILL DRIVE OUR BUDGETS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND 
FISCAL IMPACTS OF SELF DRIVING CARS ON THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 3 
(2018), https://www.clf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CLF_AV_Report.pdf. 
127 PAUL LEWIS & ALICE GROSSMAN, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP., BEYOND SPECULATION 2.0: AN 
UPDATE TO ENO’S ACTION PLAN FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 39-40 
(2019), https://www.enotrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/4-1-AV-Paper-FINAL-with-
Cover.pdf. 
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context of their use by transportation network companies (TNCs).128 
At present there are few autonomous vehicles used by TNCs which 
meet the statutory definitions of “autonomous vehicle” – although that 
will soon change.129 Nonetheless, the existing legislation provides a 
window into ways a legislature could approach the robot tax 
problem.130 
 
In 2017, the Nevada legislature adopted sweeping legislation 
regulating the use of autonomous vehicles in the state.131 Among other 
things, the statute imposed an excise tax on TNCs using fully 
autonomous vehicles: 
 
[A]n excise tax is hereby imposed on the use of a 
dispatch center, software application or other digital 
means by an autonomous vehicle network company to 
connect a passenger to a fully autonomous vehicle for 
the purpose of providing transportation services at the 
rate of 3 percent of the total fare charged for 
transportation services, which must include, without 
limitation, all fees, surcharges, technology fees, 
convenience charges for the use of a credit or debit card 
and any other amount that is part of the fare. The 
Department shall charge and collect from each 
 
 
 
 
128 Generally speaking, a TNC may be defined as a company or organization that provides 
transportation services using an online-enabled platform to connect passengers with drivers 
using their personal vehicles. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DECISION ADOPTING RULES AND 
REGULATIONS TO PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY WHILE ALLOWING NEW ENTRANTS TO THE 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY, Decision 13-09-045, at 2 (2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K192/77192335.PDF. 
129 Andrew J. Hawkins, Waymo’s Self-Driving Cars Are Now Available on Lyft’s App in 
Phoenix, VERGE (May 7, 2019, 6:01 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/7/18536003/ 
waymo-lyft-self-driving-ride-hail-app-phoenix [https://perma.cc/22FS-SP9S]. 
130 Two other states (Massachusetts and Tennessee) have considered, and so far rejected, such 
legislation. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.  
131 Assemb. B. 69, 79th Sess., (Nev. 2017) (“An Act relating to transportation; revising 
requirements for the testing or operation of an autonomous vehicle on a highway within this 
State; authorizing the use of driver-assistive platooning technology; authorizing the use of a 
fully autonomous vehicle to provide transportation services in certain circumstances by 
persons licensed by the Department of Motor Vehicles, Nevada Transportation Authority or 
Taxicab Authority, providing for the regulation of autonomous vehicle network companies; 
providing penalties; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.”).  
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autonomous vehicle network company the excise tax 
imposed by this subsection.132 
 
The statute defines “autonomous vehicle network company” as “an 
entity that, for compensation, connects a passenger to a fully 
autonomous vehicle which can provide transportation services to the 
passenger.”133 A “fully autonomous vehicle” is defined as “a vehicle 
equipped with an automated driving system which is designed to 
function at a level of driving automation of Level 4 or 5 pursuant to 
SAE J3016.”134 
 
In 2018, the California legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1184, which 
authorizes San Francisco to impose a local tax on TNCs using 
autonomous vehicles, among other things.135 San Francisco in turn has 
proposed a so-called “Traffic Congestion Mitigation Tax,” a per-ride 
tax on rides given by TNCs using autonomous vehicles.136 The 
measure contains the following definition for “autonomous vehicle 
passenger services: “‘Autonomous Vehicle’ means a vehicle, other 
than a Taxicab or Limousine, with or without a driver, equipped with 
and into which has been integrated technology that has the capability 
to drive the vehicle without the active physical control by a human 
operator, regardless of whether the vehicle is in driverless operation. 
An Autonomous Vehicle includes any vehicle capable of being driven 
by a remote driver.”137 Funds raised by this tax would be applied to a 
dedicated Traffic Congestion Mitigation Fund, funding the local mass 
 
 
 
 
132 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 372B.145(1). 
133 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 706B.030, incorporated by reference in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 372B.015. 
134 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482A.036, incorporated by reference in Nev. Rev. Stat. 706B.040. SAE 
J3016 refers to standards set by SAE International establishing Levels of Automated Driving 
by reference to the degree of autonomy of the AV in relation to the driver, level 5 being 
complete autonomy and ability to drive in all conditions without human intervention. Jennifer 
Shuttleworth, SAE Standards News: J3016 Automated-Driving Graphic Update, SOC’Y OF 
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.sae.org/news/2019/01/sae-updates-
j3016-automated-driving-graphic [https://perma.cc/SP24-88QK]. These standards have been 
adopted by the United States Department of Transportation in developing voluntary guidance 
for automated driving systems. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0: A 
VISION FOR SAFETY (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ 
13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf.  
135 Cal. Assemb. B. 1184, (Cal. 2018), codified at Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5446 (2018). 
136 S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 190584, § 3204(a)(2) (July 23, 2019). 
137 Id. § 3203. 
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transit authorities.138 This ordinance was placed on the November 
2019 ballot as Proposition D and overwhelmingly approved by the San 
Francisco electorate in that election.139 
 
Two other states, Massachusetts and Tennessee. have considered,140 
but so far not enacted,141 similar legislation regarding taxation. Both 
proposals involved a per-mile “use tax” on autonomous vehicles.142 
The Massachusetts proposal, like the Nevada law, incorporated a 
technical definition derived from the SAE standards of automation.143 
The Tennessee legislation, like the San Francisco ballot proposal, 
provided a nontechnical definition of autonomous vehicle to mean a 
motor vehicle equipped with “a system that enables the operation of a 
motor vehicle without the active physical control of, or monitoring by, 
a human operator.”144 
 
 
 
 
138 Id. § 3208. 
139 S.F. DEPT. OF ELECTIONS, “Nov. 5, 2019 Election Results, Summary,” https://sfelections.  
sfgov.org/november-5-2019-election-results-summary. 
140 Sen. B. 1561/H.B. 1564, 109th Gen. Assemb., § 12(a) (Tenn. 2016); Sen. B. 2115, 191st 
Leg. (Mass. 2019). 
141 The Tennessee bill was amended in the Tennessee Senate to remove the use tax provisions 
of the bill, which subsequently became law without the tax provisions. Legislative History, 
Sen. B. 1561/H.B. 1564, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2016), http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/ 
apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=SB1561&ga=109. The Massachusetts bill was 
referred to committee in the Massachusetts State Senate on January 22, 2019, and as of the 
date of publication has not been reported out of committee. Legislative History, Sen. B. 2115, 
191st Leg. (Mass. 2019), https://malegislature.gov/Bills/191/S2115/BillHistory . 
142 Sen. B. 1561/H.B. 1564, 109th Gen. Assemb., § 12(a) (Tenn. 2016) (“A use tax is imposed 
on autonomous vehicles that operate on the public highways within this state pursuant to 
Sections 4, 5, 9, and 10. Autonomous vehicles shall be taxed according to the number of axles. 
Autonomous vehicles with two (2) axles shall be taxed at a rate of one cent (1¢) per mile. 
Autonomous vehicles with more than two (2) axles shall be taxed at a rate of two and six-
tenths cents (2.6¢) per mile.”); Sen. B. 2115, 191st Leg., § 63E(A) & (C)(1) (Mass. 2019) (“A 
road usage charge is imposed on autonomous vehicles that operate on the public ways within 
this state . . . [at] a base per-mile rate on autonomous vehicles of no less than 2.5 cents per 
mile”). 
143 Sen. B. 2115, 191st Leg., § 1(A)(2) & (3) (Mass. 2019). 
144 Sen. B. 1561/H.B. 1564, 109th Gen. Assemb., § 12(a) (Tenn. 2016). The amended 
Tennessee bill, as enacted without the tax provisions, actually contained two different 
definitions of “autonomous technology” in non-tax contexts. The first definition, which bars 
municipalities from banning the use of autonomous vehicles, defines “autonomous 
technology” as “technology installed on a motor vehicle that has the capability to drive the 
vehicle on which the technology is installed in high or full automation mode, without any 
supervision by a human operator, with specific driving mode performance by the automated 
driving system of all aspects of the dynamic driving task that can be managed by a human 
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These examples attempt to define a particular type of robot–e.g., an 
autonomous vehicle–but in divergent ways.145 The Nevada statute and 
Massachusetts proposals both explicitly incorporate a generally 
accepted technical definition, while the San Francisco and Tennessee 
proposals use a more general, nontechnical definition without such a 
reference. The Nevada and Massachusetts definitions would be easily 
understood in the autonomous vehicle industry, but not necessarily by 
judges or tax officials. If a dispute arose, the outcome could hinge on a 
“battle of the experts,” with a lay decision maker with limited 
knowledge having to choose sides on the basis of conflicting expert 
testimony.  
 
On the other hand, the definitions in the San Francisco and Tennessee 
proposals are subject to interpretation. Even standard cruise control 
technology could be said to drive a vehicle without active physical 
control by a human operator.146 It is also noteworthy that the 
technology need not actually be used, but merely must be integrated 
into the vehicle. This could result in overbroad taxation of vehicles 
that are not truly autonomous. 
 
All of these proposals tend to disincentivize innovation by 
discouraging development of autonomous vehicle technology. To a 
certain extent, however, the taxes on autonomous vehicles may be 
considered an attempt to equalize the tax burdens of autonomous and 
 
driver, including the ability to automatically bring the motor vehicle into a minimal risk 
condition in the event of a critical vehicle or system failure or other emergency event” Tenn. 
Code § 55-8-202(b)(1) (2016). The second definitions, applying to an exception to penalties 
for operating a motor vehicle with a television or video screen visible to the driver, defines 
“autonomous technology” as “technology installed on a motor vehicle that has the capability 
to drive the motor vehicle without the active physical control or monitoring by a human 
operator.” Tenn. Code §55-9-105(c)(6)(B) (2016). 
145 Many states have defined “autonomous vehicle” or “autonomous technology” in a non-tax 
driving regulatory context. See, e.g., id.; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482A.030; Fla. Stat. § 316.003(3); 
Cal. Veh. Code § 38750(a)(1)-(2); Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.2b(1); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
32:1(1.2). D.C. Code § 50-2351(1). In that context, “[t]he definition of ‘autonomous vehicle’ 
should be precise to avoid unintentional restrictions on existing, semi-autonomous 
technology.” Deihl & Thue, supra note 122, at 211.  
146 In a non-tax context, state legislatures use more precise language specifically to avoid this 
type of overbreadth. See supra note 145. 
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non-autonomous vehicles, ensuring that operators of autonomous 
vehicles contribute to the support of the road infrastructure.147   
 
VII. Shaping the Future of Taxation 
 
This article highlights the many challenges involved in creating an 
enforceable, administrable, and practical robot tax. However, these 
challenges may not stop policymakers from trying. As Adam Smith 
pointed out in The Wealth of Nations, “[a]fter all the proper subjects 
of taxation have been exhausted, if the exigencies of the state still 
continue to require new taxes, they must be imposed upon improper 
ones.”148 In the face of an economic recession leading to dramatic 
unemployment, it may be politically expedient to blame AI, robotics 
and automation and target them for punitive taxation. Robots cannot 
vote, after all, nor do they make campaign contributions (although 
their owners might), so they may appear to be a safe target for a new 
tax.149 Therefore, it is important to consider how to avoid the worst 
policy harms from a robot tax, if political necessity requires that one 
be enacted. 
 
The worst possible robot tax legislation would have an ambiguous all-
embracing definition of what a taxable robot is, would require an 
allocation between robot-generated and non-robot-generated income, 
and would attempt to tax activity by robots that are, or could easily be 
moved, outside the jurisdiction. Such a proposal would invite 
controversy and litigation and disincentivize innovation while doing 
little to address the underlying challenges of automation on 
employment or government revenues. 
 
What, then, would a coherent, enforceable and practical robot tax look 
like? There are two potential approaches that ameliorate (although 
they do not eliminate) the practical difficulties of a robot tax: 
 
 
 
 
147 See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 190584, § 3204(a)(1) (July 23, 2019). 
148 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 
Book V, Chapter II, Part II, Article IV (1776) (ebook). 
149 Compare SXSW, supra note 43, at 57:40 (“easier to say tax a robot” than to say “tax 
corporations at 90%”).  
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Restructure incentives or implement a strict structure of which robots 
can be taxed. 
 
The first approach would be to structure tax incentives in ways that 
favor, or at least do not disincentivize, human employment. The South 
Korean roll-back of automation tax credits discussed in Part V.A 
above provides a real-world example. Explicit tax subsidies for 
automation are rare, however. It is much more common for there to be 
tax incentives that have the effect of encouraging investment in AI, 
automation and robotics without explicitly saying so, and meaningful 
reforms must address those facially neutral incentives as well.150 
 
Tax benefits can be structured in ways that tie the claimed benefit to 
employment of human workers. The recently-repealed domestic 
production activities deduction (known affectionately in tax circles as 
“Section 199” after the relevant Code section) tied the tax benefit 
explicitly to employment by placing a W-2 limitation on the 
deduction.151 The passthrough deduction in Section 199A also has a 
W-2 limitation, although that limitation can alternatively be met by 
reference to the unadjusted basis of tangible assets.152 There is 
precedent, therefore, for structuring a tax benefit in a way that ties that 
benefit to employment. Because this is an affirmative tax subsidy of 
employment, not a tax on “robots,” the definitional problems are 
minimized.  
 
 
 
 
 
150 Cf. Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 6, at 169-71 (disallowing corporate tax 
deductions for automated workers); Ooi & Goh, supra note 4, at 18 (suggesting the adoption 
of “decelerated depreciation” or “reverse depreciation,” reducing or reversing the tax benefits 
generally accorded for the deployment of capital assets for assets deemed to be employment-
substituting). 
151 I.R.C § 199(b)(1) (“The amount of the deduction allowable under [Section 199] for any 
taxable year shall not exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages of the taxpayer for the taxable 
year”), repealed by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, Title I, § 
13305(a), 2017 (131 Stat. 2126), effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 
2017. 
152 I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2) (2017) (“The amount determined under this paragraph with respect to 
any qualified trade or business is the lesser of— (A) 20 percent of the taxpayer’s qualified 
business income with respect to the qualified trade or business, or (B) the greater of— (i) 50 
percent of the W–2 wages with respect to the qualified trade or business, or (ii) the sum of 25 
percent of the W–2 wages with respect to the qualified trade or business, plus 2.5 percent of 
the unadjusted basis immediately after acquisition of all qualified property.”). 
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By tying a tax benefit to W-2 wages (which presumably would 
produce income and payroll tax revenues), the revenue impact of the 
tax subsidy is reduced and may slow the process of job dislocation 
(leading to a reduction in those sources of revenue), without providing 
as large of a hurdle to innovation.   
 
Of course, as with any tax expenditure, there is a risk that the benefit is 
merely subsidizing what taxpayers would do anyway. Featherbedding 
also becomes an issue.153 This approach also does little to increase net 
revenue. Nonetheless, such a proposal would be preferable to a straight 
“robot tax.” 
 
The second approach would be to implement a narrowly-targeted tax 
on specific, easily-defined types of AI, robotics, or automation, 
imposed at the level at which consumers could not practically choose 
alternative sources outside of their jurisdiction. The narrowness of the 
targeted technology avoids the definitional issues surrounding “what is 
a robot” disputes. It is easier to define a narrower subset, such as a 
“robot barista” than to attempt an all-encompassing definition of a 
“robot.” This task becomes even easier if the definition of a taxable 
robot can be tied to a non-tax technical standard (such as the SAE 
standards for autonomous vehicles) – so long as judges and tax 
administrators are able to understand and apply those standards. A 
South Korea-style white list is also a possibility, although an all-
encompassing list of taxable AI, robots, and automation equipment 
seems impractical, particularly given the pace of technological change 
that would quickly make such a list obsolete. 
 
The appropriate jurisdictional level of taxation would depend on the 
targeted type of robot. A barista must be within close physical 
 
 
 
 
153 See, e.g., Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 103 (1953) 
(showcasing that featherbedding is not just a theoretical concern. In response to the 
introduction of a linotype machine for printing newspapers, which eliminated the need for 
human compositors to set type by hand, the International Typographical Union arranged with 
newspaper publishers to employ compositors to produce unnecessary duplicates for linotype-
set advertisements by hand, a practice known as “setting bogus” that the Supreme Court 
described as “a wasteful procedure.”). It does not tax the imagination to conceive of a business 
hiring unnecessary employees to reach a W-2 threshold in order to claim a tax benefit, should 
the amount of benefit exceed the cost of the employees’ wages.
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proximity of a customer buying a latte, so a tax on robot baristas 
would be appropriate on a local level. A tax on autonomous vehicles 
using a country’s road system would be best enforced and most 
practically handled at a national level.  
 
The major weakness of this second approach is the narrowness of the 
effect. A tax on robot baristas would likely, at least in the short run, 
encourage the employment of human baristas. However, it would do 
little for employees in other businesses or professions. Further, this 
approach encourages special pleading by influential interest groups, 
whose interests may not necessarily coincide with sound public policy. 
Another, related weakness to the “rifle shot” approach is that it is most 
effective as to specific types of activities that can be effectively taxed 
at a local, regional, or national level. Viewed from an international 
lens, the justification for such narrowly-based taxes weakens 
considerably. Preserving a handful of barista jobs in a particular 
metropolitan area would be a drop in the bucket in the face of massive 
job dislocation across industries and geographic borders. International 
coordination could prove as elusive as in the digital tax context. 
Alternatively, if political pressures require implementation of a robot 
tax, a rifle-shot approach targeted to politically-sensitive job categories 
would be superior to a blunderbuss “tax all robots” proposal. 
 
It is possible that technological advancement could permit a more 
direct solution. Perhaps eventually a robot or AI would become 
sufficiently advanced that it would be able to enter into contracts and 
manage bank accounts on its own behalf. In that instance, it is not far-
fetched to conceive of such an advanced technology to be capable of 
being taxed directly, much like a human taxpayer.154 For example, a 
cryptocurrency-based system of taxation could be constructed for such 
advanced robots to facilitate payment.155 However, such technology is 
sufficiently far in the future that one cannot consider this to be a 
practical proposal. 
 
 
 
 
 
154 Oberson, supra note 6, at 260-61. 
155 See generally Ahmed, supra note 6. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
Any tax system that relies on human effort to raise revenues, through 
income or payroll taxes, is vulnerable to dislocation with the rise of 
AI, automation, and robotics. Alternative revenue sources must be 
found, somewhere, somehow, to alleviate these burdens.156 While the 
practicalities of implementing and administering a robot tax do not 
support widespread adoption of such a tax to solve this dilemma, the 
robot tax debate has had the salutary effect of initiating the 
conversation about how to address this challenge.  
 
 
 
 
 
156 Some recommended alternatives include imposing a payroll tax or other additional taxes on 
capital income, or a VAT (in the United States, which does not currently have a VAT). See, 
e.g., OBERSON, supra note 2, at 139-42; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 171-73; 
Mazur, supra note 6, at 309-22. The search for such alternatives is beyond the scope of this 
article, however. 
